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SOLOMON'S WISDOM OR SOLOMON'S WISDOM LOST: CHILD
CUSTODY IN NORTH DAKOTA-A PRESUMPTION THAT JOINT
CUSTODY IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN
CUSTODY DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
King Solomon ruled the kingdom of Israel with a knowledge and
wisdom which were known throughout his land.1 One of the most well
known examples of Solomon's wisdom was his resolution of a dispute
between two women, both of whom claimed to be the mother of a child,
and both of whom desired custody. 2 In this infamous story, Solomon
was able to determine who the actual mother was and gave her custody
of the child. 3 But Solomon's wisdom would be lost in modem day
custody disputes. Would Solomon's solution have been as simple if the
argument for custody was between the biological mother and father?
Would Solomon have had to weigh both parties' interests to decide what
was in the best interests of the child? Would he have thought about a
solution that would have allowed both parents to have custody? Or
would he have just threatened to cut the child in half and wait for one of
the parents to acquiesce? These are questions which will forever remain
unanswered. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court still uses
Solomon's example in explaining several of its decisions for child
custody. 4 Although our courts do not use swords to make decisions,
1. See 1 Kings 4:29-31.
God gave Solomon wisdom and very great insight, and a breadth of understanding as
measureless as the sand on the seashore. Solomon's wisdom was greater than the
wisdom of all the men of the East, and greater than all the wisdom of Egypt... [aInd his
fame spread to all the surrounding nations.
Id.
2. See 1 Kings 3:24-27. Solomon solved the problem of determining who the mother was in this
way:
Then the king said, "Bring me a sword." So they brought a sword for the king. He then
gave an order: "Cut the living child in two and give half to one and half to the other."
The woman whose son was alive was filled with compassion for her son and said to the
king, "Please, my lord, give her the living baby! Don't kill him!" But the other said,
"Neither I nor you shall have him. Cut him in two!" Then the king gave his ruling:
"Give the living baby to the first woman. Do notkill him; she is his mother."
Id.
3. Id.
4. See Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 501-02 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting)
(discussing Solomon's wisdom and his acuity of knowledge to help in determining child custody);
Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1986) (evoking the wisdom of Solomon in deciding
whether split custody may be proper).
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their words can cut as quickly as any blade. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has stated that it does not have the wisdom of Solomon, 5 but in a
society of ever increasing divorce and child custody battles the wisdom
of kings would be welcome.
This Note will discuss child custody in North Dakota and the factors
considered in determining which parent should be awarded custody.
Specifically, this Note will discuss joint custody and argue that it is the
best solution for the child and parents. Furthermore, this Note will
propose that a presumption for joint legal custody and an emphasis on
joint physical custody should be found in child custody cases, rebutted
only when the statutory factors indicate joint custody is not in the best
interests of the child.
Part II of this Note will give a brief history of the development of
child custody law. Part III will analyze the development of North
Dakota's child custody law, with particular focus on North Dakota's
treatment of joint custody and primary caregiver theories. Part IV will
analyze recent North Dakota custody cases and discuss how the current
trend seems to be to discourage joint custody arrangements and favor
awarding custody to the primary caregiver. Finally, Part V will propose
changing North Dakota's best interest statute to include a presumption
for joint custody arrangements and will demonstrate how this change
would better promote the best interests of children and the divorced
parents.
II. NORTH DAKOTA'S CHILD CUSTODY DILEMMA
A. DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY
Before discussing North Dakota's child custody laws, it is helpful to
understand the development of child custody law throughout the legal
system. This in turn will help in understanding the basis of North
Dakota's child custody law. While this Note does not purport to be a
complete discourse on child custody theories, it is helpful to be aware of
how different theories developed and where the major strengths and
weaknesses of each lie.
North Dakota uses the best interest of the child standard to resolve
the difficult issue of child custody. 6 It was not until 1979 that the
5. See Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D. 1985) (stating that a choice
between parents is rarely easy, for neither the trial court nor the supreme court has the wisdom of
Solomon).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (Supp. 1995); see
Ternes v. Ternes, 555 N.W.2d 355, 356-57 (N.D. 1996) (finding it not clearly erroneous that the trial
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legislature enacted specific criteria for the courts to evaluate what the
best interests of the child would be. 7 Since that time, the best interests of
the child statute has undergone many revisions and changes. 8 The
court applied the best interests of the child standard by determining that certain factors applied to the
custody in this case, while other factors were not applicable); Fahlsing v. Teters, 552 N.W.2d 87, 89
(N.D. 1996) (stating that a trial court is statutorily vested with the duty to award custody to the parent
who will promote the best interests of the child under section 14-09-06.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code and when awarding custody, the court should consider all relevant factors affecting the best
interests of the child as enumerated in section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code);
DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 924 (N.D. 1975) (finding that an award of custody must
contain a reference to the basis for the trial court's decision, demonstrating the award is based upon
the best interests of the child).
7. Award of Custody, ch. 194, sec. 3, 1979 N.D. Laws 423. The original 1979 best interests of
the child statute listed ten factors for custody consideration:
1. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and
child.
2. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affection, and
guidance and to continue the education of the child.
3. The disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical
care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state
in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
4. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity.
5. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home.
6. The moral fitness of the parents.
7. The mental and physical health of the parents.
8. The home, school, and community record of the child.
9. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference.
10. Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
Id.; see also Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 126 (N.D. 1980) (stating that the factors in section
14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code were not a departure from existing case law that has
evolved over the past decade for North Dakota, but were merely a codification of factors always
relevant to child custody).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2. In 1989 the North Dakota legislature amended section
14-09-06.2 to include domestic violence as a factor to be considered in child custody. Id. The 1989
amendment read:
J. The existence of domestic violence. If the court finds that domestic violence has
occurred, the court shall provide for a custody arrangement that best protects the
child and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of
domestic violence from any further harm. As used in this subdivision, "domestic
violence" means domestic violence as defined in section 14-07.1-01.
K. The interaction and interrelationship, or the potential for interaction and
interrelationship, of the child with any person who resides in, is present, or
frequents the household of a parent and who may significantly affect the child's
best interests. The court shall consider that person's history of inflicting, or
tendency to inflict, physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, on other persons.
Domestic Violence in Custody Determinations, ch. 178, sec. 2, 1989 N.D. Laws 547. In 1991, the
legislature again amended section 14-09-06.2. The new sections read:
J. Evidence of domestic violence. In awarding custody or granting rights of
visitation, the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence. If the court
finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, this evidence creates
a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may
not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child. This presumption may be
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statute is considered a menu or checklist of all relevant factors to be
considered, with no factor being more important than another. 9 In addi-
tion to several "specific" factors listed in the statute it includes a
"catch-all" factor, which the courts have used to consider any other
relevant factors which may be important in the custody decision.10
North Dakota courts have used this factor to introduce both the primary
caregiver status and joint custody theories into custody decisions.lI
As far back as Roman law and in the earliest developments of child
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the
child require that parent's participation as a custodial parent. The court shall cite
specific findings of fact to show that the custody or visitation arrangement best
protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the
victim of domestic violence. If necessary to protect the welfare of the child,
custody may be awarded to a suitable third person, provided that the person would
not allow access to a violent parent except as ordered by the court. If the court
awards custody to a third person, the court shall give priority to the child's nearest
suitable relative. The fact that the abused parent suffers from the effects of the
abuse may not be grounds for denying that parent custody.
L. The making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent against the
other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02.
Evidence in Custody Decisions, ch. 148, sec. 2, 1991 N.D. Laws 413.
The issue of domestic violence in child custody disputes is beyond the scope of this note. The
problems with domestic violence in America are immense and well documented. However, North
Dakota case law and the statutory presumption create an antithetical position to ensuring that parental
rights are maintained. This Note focuses on the problem of determining custody between two fit
parents, and thus does not discuss many of the recent joint custody cases which have focused on the
problem of domestic violence in the marriage and the rebuttable presumption against allowing the
perpetrator custody of the child. See Krank v. Krank, 541 N.W.2d 714, 718 (N.D. 1996) (applying the
presumption against custody for the father as a perpetrator of domestic violence); Bruner v. Hager,
534 N.W.2d 825, 828-29 (N.D. 1995) (remanding the case back to the trial court for determinations of
whether domestic violence existed when primary custody had been awarded to the father); Heck v.
Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 159, 166 (N.D. 1995) (finding that the presumption applied against the father
gaining custody of his children because of evidence of violent behavior toward his wife, although the
trial court found him to be the more interested and potentially better parent); see also Kathleen
Garner, Comment, Applying The Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding Custody To Perpetrators Of
Domestic Violence, 72 N.D. L. REV. 155 (1996) (discussing Heck v. Reed and child custody matters
where domestic abuse is apparent in the household).
9. See Foreng v. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38, 40 (1993) (stating that section 14-09-06.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides the courts with a menu of relevant factors in considering the best
interests of the child); see also Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 622 (finding that the guiding standard for the
best interests of the child "must 'be determined by the court's consideration and evaluation of aft
factors affecting... the child' as enumerated in 14-09-06.2.") (emphasis added). But see Bruner, 534
N.W.2d at 828 ("The [statutory] presumption places an emphasis on domestic violence as the
paramount factor in a custodial placement when credible evidence of domestic violence appears.");
Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 162 (stating that the legislative intent of subsection (j) in section 14-09-06.2 puts
a heavier burden on a parent who is the perpetrator of domestic violence that may be overcome only
by clear and convincing evidence).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(m) (Supp. 1995).
11. See Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 622 (finding that the primary caretaker has not been given
elevated status but "in North Dakota the concept inheres in the statutory factors"); Lapp, 293 N.W.2d
at 129 (stating that the court properly considered the enumerated factors in section 14-09-06.2 of the
North Dakota Century Code in finding that joint or "alternating" custody would be proper).
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custody, a preference was given to fathers based on property rights.12
English law adopted basically the same form and discarded any interest
the mother had. in the custody of her children. 13 By the turn of the 20th
century, however, the courts' acknowledgment of mothers' abilities to
nurture children helped to change custody from a property issue to one
that looked at the maternal nature of women in rearing the children. 14
The American legal system developed from this premise, with an
eye towards the best interests of the child. 15 The development of the law
took into consideration both the father's and mother's interests in the
child.16 Over time, the recognition of the mother as a legitimate care-
giver grew into a maternal preference in child custody,17 known as the
tender years doctrine.18
B. THE TENDER YEARS DOCTRINE
The tender years doctrine was based on a sentimental approach:
that a child's development from the womb through adolescence was best
12. See David Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 351 (1979) (stating that Roman law
allowed a father to sell or even kill his children without punishment); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing The Tie
That Binds: Preference For The Primary Caretaker As Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 486 (1987)
(discussing the property interests that the head of the household had in his wives, children, and slaves,
which were protected like other objects of ownership) (citing Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 180 (1916)); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking
Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 464 n.41 (1984) (stating the paternal preference was based on the
fact that the father was the one with decision-making authority and was the one obligated to support
his family while the mother was entitled only to reverence and respect).
13. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 464 (explaining that the father, by law, was entitled to
custody of his children). .
14. See generally O'Kelly, supra note 12, at 487-88 (discussing the discretion of judges to give
maternal custody); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 465 (discussing reforms which allowed judges
discretion to order maternal custody of children under the age of seven).
15. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 466 n.47 (citing Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433
(1925)). Justice Cardozo was instrumental in developing the best interest of the child standard. Id.
However, the doctrine did not develop quickly from there because of the presumption of custody with
the mother under the tender years doctrine. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing
the tender years doctrine).
16. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating that the history and culture of America
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for their children and their upbringing); see also DAVID
STEWART, T HE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, A s ESTABLISHED IN E Nt3LAND AND THE UNITED S TATES
384 (1884) (noting that parental rights in custody of a child are foremost because natural affection is
believed to guarantee the child's welfare).
17. See O'Kelly, supra note 12, at 495-500 (discussing the tender years doctrine and its
application in North Dakota); Ramsey Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 335, 340-42 (1982) (stating that the tender years presumption gradually became the dominant
rule over the first half of the 20th century); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 464 n.41 (discussing the
tender years doctrine's development).
18. See generally Klaff, supra note 17, at 341 n.43 and accompanying text (noting that by 1900,
30 states had created equal parenting rights). This means that those states had created a maternal
preference based on the tender years doctrine.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:263
developed through a mother's nurturing.19 As long as the mother was
found to be fit, she was entitled to custody of her children. 20 Therefore,
motherhood was the prevailing factor that determined custody for much
of America's early history. 21
North Dakota's early child custody law accepted the tender years
doctrine. 22 North Dakota was one of several States which created a
statutory presumption for custody with the mother based on the tender
years doctrine. 23 However in 1973, the North Dakota legislature
repealed the part of the statute which established a maternal preference. 24
During this same time, society's ideas concerning roles that women
could have outside the home began to evolve and change. 25 In addition,
attitudes toward parenting changed. 26 Although attitudes toward the
gender of parents changed, the nuclear family has maintained its
autonomy, 27 meaning that the family has the fundamental right of
self-determination. 28 When the family is able to function and make
decisions as an autonomous unit, that right should not be diminished
based on the fact that one of those decisions is to dissolve the
relationship. 29
19. See O'Kelly, supra note 12, at 495 (noting that tender years presumptions were often
expressed in excessively sentimental terms).
20. See Klaff, supra note 17, at 342 (discussing the development of the tender years doctrine into
a rigid rule mandating maternal custody unless the mother was found unfit). Klaff states that if a child
is deprived of developing a relationship with its mother during infancy that child will be "retarded in its
physical, intellectual, and social development and runs a high risk of being permanently afflicted with
a non-attachment personality disorder." Id. at 345-46.
21. Id. at 341 (discussing the tender years doctrine being used as the court's basis for custody
awards by the end of the nineteenth century).
22. See generally O'Kelly, supra note 12, at 495-500 (discussing the tender years doctrine's
development in North Dakota).
23. Id. at 497 (noting that the statutory presumption for the tenders years preference to the
mother lasted from 1877 to 1973).
24. Id. at 499-500 (discussing the repealing of tender years preference).
25. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTrEMP. PROBS. 226, 235-36 (1975) (stating that the women's movement of
the 1970's and the increased amount of mothers entering the workforce helped in displacing the
maternal preference in child custody cases to a best interests of the child evaluation); Scott, infra note
50, at 620 (stating that gender roles have changed in society as more mothers entered the work force).
26. See Scott, infra note 50, at 620 (discussing the fact that fathers also began to take on greater
involvement in the care of their children).
27. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1323
(1980) (discussing that the constitutional framework provides that a parents' interest in directing their
child's upbringing is strong and that there is an importance in maintaining family autonomy).
28. Id. at 1323. The article discusses the fact that in every State the court is vested with juris-
diction to enter an order regarding child custody after a divorce. Id. This is the case whether the
parents have agreed to a certain custody arrangement or if it is contested. Id. The article points out
that uncontested single custody arrangements are rarely interfered with, while joint custody arrange-
ments are frequently disapproved of by the court's discretionary power. Id. at 1324.
29. Id. at 1323. The article analogizes the death of a parent with a divorce between parents. Id.
at 1323-24. In the former situation, the State has no right to step in to decide the best interests of the
268
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PARENTING
While the development of child custody policies has shifted between
parental preferences, the United States Supreme Court has maintained
that both parents have a constitutional right to custody of their children
which should not be hindered. 30 The Supreme Court has analyzed the
importance of child custody; weighing the vital interest the State has in
protecting children and considering their best interests against the right
of parents to raise their children as they see fit.31 In one child custody
case where the parents decided on their own who was to have custody of
their child, the Court found that the State could still step in and deter-
mine if the custody agreement was in the best interests of the child. 32
Although there are times when the State's interest is paramount to
the parent's interest, the Court has laid out guiding principles for when
the parent's interests outweigh those of the States.33 In the case of
Bellotti v. Baird,34 the Court provided requisite factors explaining why
the State should give deference to parents raising their children. 35  The
Court stated:
The State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
justification for State deference to parental control over
children is that '[the] child is not the mere creature of the
child, although a death of a parent is more likely to be traumatic to the child than divorce. Id. But, in
the area of divorce, the courts have immediate jurisdiction whether or not there is a need for
protection of the children. Id. at 1323.
30. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 484 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that the Supreme Court has maintained a liberty interest, protected by the
Constitution, in allowing parents to develop relationships with their children); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that "cardinal with us [is] that custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder").
31. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 484; Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
32. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (stating that "the question of custody, so vital to a
child's happiness and well-being, frequently cannot by left to the discretion of parents"). But see Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (stating that "[tlhe intangible fibers that connect parent and
child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with
strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional
protection in appropriate cases").
33. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979) (finding that parents have the right and duty to
care for and provide the guiding role for their children); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (recognizing that it is the parents' responsibility to prepare their children for his or her
obligations to society).
34. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
35. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-39.
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State; those who nurture him [or her] and direct his [or her]
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him [or her] for additional obligations'. . . . This
affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by
precept and example is essential to the growth of young people
into mature, socially responsible citizens. Unquestionably,
there are many competing theories about the most effective
way for parents to fulfill their central role in assisting their
children on the way to responsible adulthood .. . [and] we
cannot ignore that central to many of these theories, and
deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the
belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of
authority over one's children .... Under the Constitution, the
State can 'properly conclude that parents ...who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.' 36
The Court has gone further in stating that "[a] State pursues a
legitimate end under the Constitution when it attempts to foster and
preserve the parent-child relationship by giving all parents the opportu-
nity to participate in the care and nurture of their children." 37 The
Court has also noted that a parent's rights deserve protection where the
parent has "sired and raised" that child. 38 The Constitution undeniably
warrants deference to the parents absent a powerful countervailing
interest. 39
The Court in Stanley v. Illinois40 reasoned that the protection of a
parent's right to custody of his or her own children is an interest that is
worth paramount protection. 4 1 In Stanley, the Court recognized that the
father's right to be a parent and to provide care for his children was a
constitutional right which should not be taken away without a showing of
36. Id. (citations omitted).
37. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 484 (1990).
38. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
39. Id.
40. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
41. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. The Court found that the father should receive custody of his
children after their mother's death, stating:
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children "come[s] to this court with a momentum for respect





good cause. 42 Because Mr. Stanley was shown to be a fit parent, it was
determined that he should have custody of his children. 43 Although the
Stanley case was one where the issue was between the rights of the
natural father and the rights of non-parents, the ruling is sound as to the
rights parents have in regard to their child's custody. The words still
ring true today that "the primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition." 44
Applying constitutional protections for child custody is somewhat
problematic, however, since the Constitution protects against state inter-
ference in the rights of a mother and father only as long as the family
unit is intact. 45 When divorce occurs, the protections and rights of the
parents under the Constitution give way to state-created best interests of
the child standards. 46 Greater emphasis needs to be put on the pro-
tection of the parent's individual liberty interest, which is in the bringing
up of one's own children, whether that be during marriage or after
divorce. 47
D. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
The outdated preference for the mother over the father, based on
the tender years doctrine, was generally abolished by the early 1970's. 48
Most states have enacted a best interests of the child standard, which
takes several factors into consideration.49 The best interests theory was
42. Id. The Court emphasized its long history in holding the rights of parenting and family as con-
stitutionally protected. Id. The Court pointed out the rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed "essential," the "basic civil ights of man," and "[r]ights far more precious ...
than property rights." Id. (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
43. Id. at 657-59.
44. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 484 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
45. Ellen Canacakos, Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right, reprinted in Joiwr CUSTODY AND
SHARED PARENTING 223, 225 (Jay Folberg ed. 1984) (1981).
46. See id. (stating that the State's paramount concern is the welfare of the child which in turn
makes the parent's rights of custody and control subject to the court's perceptions of the advancement
of the best interests of the child). Canacakos points out that the vital inquiry is whether a constitutional
protection of parental custody is dependent on the nuclear family remaining intact or if it is
independent within each parent. Id. She concludes that the constitutional protection does not come
from the family unit per se, but rests in the rights of individuals. Id. at 226.
47. See id. at 228 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty interest in the individual to "marry, establish a home and
bring up children")) (emphasis added).
48. See O'Kelly, supra note 12, at 497 (noting that the tender years doctrine was abolished in
North Dakota in 1973).
49. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (Supp. 1995) (listing factors to be used in determining the
NOTE
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greeted by many as a welcome change to the tender years doctrine. 50
However, others saw it as giving the courts broader discretion to deter-
mine custody by allowing the courts to look at every facet of the
parents' performance.5' Because of this, many custody determinations
evolve into a battle of who has best served the child.52 One author called
this practice "a destructive contest in which each parent competes to
expose the flaws of the other."5 3 What occurs is an adversarial contest
where the court may be forced to speculate as to how much care each
parent has provided, which parent has the better job, or which parent can
cook and clean better. 54 Other courts, although applying the best
interest of the child factors, may still be persuaded by older, traditional
stereotypes and give custody to the mother when the weight of the
evidence is not so obviously in her favor.55
Because of the problems of determining the best interests of the
child through a list of statutory factors, some scholars and judges have
suggested alternatives to evaluating the best interests of the child.56
best interests of the child); see also Mnookin, supra note 25, at 235-36 (discussing the fact that most
States have enacted statutes which provide for the best interests of the child standard). Mnookin is
well known as discussing the problems inherent in applying the factors under the best interest analysis
to child custody. Id. at 231-32; see also Scott & Dedreyn, supra note 12, at 466 (discussing application
of the best interest standard).
50. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV.
615, 620 (1992) (stating that due to an evolution in gender and parenting roles, the tender years
doctrine seemed less viable because it reinforced stereotypical gender roles). Scott points out that
fathers favored the gender-neutral best interests of the child over the maternal preference given
mothers by the tender years doctrine. Id. at 623. Initially, feminists supported the innovation of best
interests because they saw it as a break from reinforcing stereotyped gender norms. Id. at 620.
51. See Mnookin, supra note 25, at 230, 253-54 (discussing the trial court's broad discretion in
custody determinations).
52. See id. at 257. The application of the best interests standard may incur substantial application
costs because of the need for considerable information about the family structure and the difficulty in
predicting how children will be affected in the future based on which parent they will live with. See
id. at 257-61 (discussing the considerable information needed to make a child custody decision); Scott,
supra note 50, at 622 (noting that courts use a wide-open evaluation of factors which may be
speculative and value-laden depending on the court doing the evaluating); Scott & Derdeyn, supra
note 12, at 466-67 (stating that the individualized nature of the best interests standard gives judges
great discretion in determining what weight should be given non-specific criteria).
53. Scott, supra note 50, at 622.
54. See generally Mnookin, supra note 25, at 257-61 (stating that the judge will determine the
weight to be given different criteria and that the value a judge places on fitness or affection will
greatly affect the outcome of a case); Scott, supra note 50, at 622 (noting that courts apply the factors
inconsistently or possibly imprecisely due to the fact that no guidance is given on how to weigh past
performance).
55. See Miller, supra, note 12, at 353-54 (noting that even with legislation that calls for the rights
of parents to be equal in custody determinations, 90% of contested custody determinations result in
awards to the mother, additionally, in 90% of divorce cases that never reach the court, mothers will
assume custody); Scott, supra note 50, at 622 (noting that the best interests standard may be applied
unevenly based on a judge's stereotypical assumptions).
56. See Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980) (stating that the court is aware of
clamoring by parents to clarify child custody laws); Mnookin, supra note 25, at 246 (stating that
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Justice Levine, 57 during her tenure on the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated she would like to see solutions which would offer more consist-
ency in dealing with the difficult problems facing the court in child
custody. 58
E. PRIMARY CAREGIVER
One suggested alternative has been that of establishing custody
through analysis of who has acted as the primary caregiver. 59 The
primary caregiver doctrine gives the parent who has provided the
majority of the child's daily care, and thus established the emotional and
physical bonds which are important to the child's development, a
preference toward custody based on the desirability of maintaining and
developing these bonds.60 Many groups embraced the primary care-
giver standard as a fairer way to establish child custody.61
Most States that consider the primary caregiver theory in child
impatience has arisen in the judicial, legislative, and scholarly sectors because of a need for more
uniform standards in child custody cases).
57. Justice Beryl Levine served on the North Dakota Supreme Court as the first female Justice to
ever do so. In her years of service on the court, Justice Levine penned many of the decisions in the
family law and domestic relations area. In addition, she was a great advocate for using the idea of a
primary caregiver in determining child custody.
58. See Dinius v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210, 218 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
primary caregiver presumption, stating "[i]f trial courts are to have any guidance and this court is to
conduct any meaningful, principled review" the court should identify and analyze specific factors
which would help in that endeavor).
59. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). Garska is one of the first
reported cases to have used the primary caregiver as a factor for awarding custody. Id. In Garska,
West Virginia's highest court held that the best interests of a child would be with his or her primary
caregiver when that child is too young to express a preference. Id. The court in Garska set out
criteria by which the court could evaluate which parent was the primary caregiver:
[T]he trial court shall determine which parent has taken primary responsibility for, inter
alia, the performance of the following caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1)
preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing,
cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians;
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends'
houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e.
baby-sitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the
middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general
manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10)
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Id.; see also Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713-14 (Minn. 1985) (recognizing the importance
of a primary caretaker in young children's lives). The Minnesota Supreme Court in Pikula followed
the example set down in Garska and awarded custody to the primary caregiver. Id.
60. See O'Kelly, supra note 12, at 484 (stating that the position of primary caregiver is the most
important consideration for custody based on the intimate interaction between the child and his or her
primary parent because of a unique psychological bond between the two).
61. See Scott, supra note 50, at 627-28 (stating that certain groups, including some feminists, view
child custody as continually downplaying the importance of the mother and believe that mothers face a
greater risk of losing custody under the best interests of the child standard).
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custody cases will use it as only one factor in the custody decision. 62
However, there may be growing support for the adoption of a primary
caregiver presumption. 63 Critics of the primary caregiver doctrine state
that it is merely an attempt to return to the tender years doctrine and a
presumption that the best interests for child custody are with the
mother.64 Other commentators have noted that as the traditional roles of
parenting become more blurred, the primary caregiver status becomes
difficult to determine, which reduces its value as an easily administered
theory. 65
F. JOINT CUSTODY
The other child custody theory which has evolved in the courts is
that of joint custody, which is a continually expanding sector in the field
of child custody law. 66 Joint custody originally developed out of a
concern that fathers were not being treated equally in child custody
cases. 67 Joint custody, in many States, is looked at as the favored
custody arrangement because it is fair to both parents and is in the best
interest of the child. 68 There may be numerous reasons why joint
custody may better help children to cope with divorce: it may more
closely resemble the intact family; it may continue to foster parent-child
relationships between both parents; and it may ensure that the child is
spending "quality" time with each parent and not time with a "visit-
ing" parent.69 Currently, forty-one States and the District of Columbia
62. See IRA MARKELLMA ET AL., FAMILY LAW 513 (2d ed. 1991) (stating the proposition that
many more states may be using the primary caretaker as a factor in the consideration of its child
custody decisions).
63. See id. at 513 (citing Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 705); In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1220-21
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 618 P.2d 465, 466-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that
identification of the primary caretaker is relevant in custody decisions).
64. See Scott, supra note 50, at 628-29 (discussing the return to the tender years doctrine with the
primary caregiver status); see also Klaff, supra note 17, at 344-49 (discussing the presumption for the
tender years doctrine in terms of who is the primary caregiving parent).
65. See Scott, supra note 50, at 629 (stating the primary caregiver could become obsolete or
increasingly unhelpful in custody disputes where there is greater sharing of child care between
parents).
66. See Miller, supra note 12, at 359-60 (stating that there is no precise definition for joint
custody but that it is both parents sharing responsibility and authority with respect to the children).
67. See Scott, supra note 50, at 624 (discussing the introduction of joint custody theory in the
early 1980's by divorced fathers).
68. See infra note 196 (listing several state statutes which have made joint custody the paramount
concern for that state); Miller, supra note 12, at 362 (noting that "joint custody provides the child with
love, attention, training, and influence of both parents"); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 455
(pointing out that a substantial body of literature has appeared in favor of joint custody and that there
has been an accelerating momentum toward joint custody).
69. See Miller, supra note 12, at 363 (noting that a "visiting" or "visited" parent does not have the
opportunity to be a true object of love, support, or trust. Additionally, children with joint custodial
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have statutes which address joint child custody. 70 Only eight states,
including North Dakota, have no statutory authority for joint custody.71
1. Joint Custody Versus The "Visiting" Parent
Among the most common criticisms of sole custody is the fact that
the other non-custodial parent is given "visitation rights."72 In addition,
sole custody is seen as inflexible and unable to change as both the parent
and child change. 73 Further, there may be the unambiguous signal that
one parent is right while the other is wrong, or that one parent is the true
parents are able to spend more time with a parent, especially quality time, than children who have a
non-custodial visiting parent).
70. ALA. CODE § 30-3-150 (Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.060, 25.20.090, 25.20.130
(Michie 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (1996); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3080 to 3089 (West 1994);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-123.5 to -124 (1988 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b to 56a
(West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 727 to 728 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-6 (Harrison 1994); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 571-46 to -46.1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1996); 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/602.1,
5/610 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
598.1, 598.21, 598.41 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:335 to :337 (Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1997); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 518.003, 518.17 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
452.375 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-222 to -224 (1995); NEa. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.480, 125.490 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:17 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (Michie 1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.04, 3109.041 (Anderson 1996);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169 (1995); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5302, 5304, 5306 (West 1991); S.D. CoDiFmDLAWS § 25-5-7.1 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-101 (1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.005, 153.007, 153.131 (West 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 650, 660, 670 (1989 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-124.1 (Michie 1995); and WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
Not every State defines custody in terms of both "joint legal custody" and "joint physical
custody." See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1992) (referring to the joint custody
of children as a shared custody plan); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West 1993) (defining joint
custody in a singular term without breaking down the joint legal and joint physical custody); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.005 (West 1996) (referring to parents as sole or joint conservators). All of the
statutes speak in terms of some type of shared custody or custody to ensure that both parents maintain
custody and that the child has an opportunity to interact with both parents.
Of the 41 states that have a joint custody statute, 14 of those states and the District of Columbia
have a presumption for joint custody. Several of the presumptions only operate if both parents agree
on joint custody. The states which have a joint custody presumption are: California, Florida, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas.
71. The states which have no statutory authority for joint custody are: Arkansas, Maryland, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Among the states listed, North Dakota and Rhode Island mention joint custody within the discussion of
domestic abuse. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.20) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(a)(1)
(1996).
72. See Miller, supra note 12, at 355, 363 (discussing visitation rights given to the non-custodial
parent and that the visiting parent has little chance to develop the role of nurturer who can provide
love, trust, and identification to the child).
73. Id. at 355.
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parent while the other is only someone who brings gifts or comes only to
play with the child for a few hours.74 There is also a great deal of
evidence to show that a child's development is not only furthered by the
involvement of the mother but that a great deal of influence comes from
a father who is present in his child's life.75 Furthermore, the problems
arising in the sole custody arrangement are not limited to the
non-custodial parent but also affect the parent who maintains daily
control of the child.76
2. Constructive Arguments For and Against Joint Custody
Studies on joint custody arrangements have shown that joint
custody is a viable, working option in the child custody field. 77 But not
74. Id. at 355-56. Although Miller's comments in regard to visitation are gender stereotypical,
with the mother regarded as the custodial parent and the father as the visiting parent, the foundation of
his argument and problems that arise in the sole custody arrangement are applicable to any
custodial/non-custodial arrangement. Id. Miller points out several problems with a sole custody
arrangement where the father is denied frequent access to his child. Id. The child is denied access to
his or her father's view of the world and the opportunity to develop a deep personal relationship with
him. Id. In turn, the father may lose his self-esteem based on his loss of authority and begin to
decrease or terminate his visits. Id. Many times, even the most loving and caring fathers may become
despondent and lose interest. Id.
75. See id. at 358-59 (stating that "[r]esearch has shown that the father's greatest impact on his
children occurs primarily in those areas involving psychosexual, personality, social and intellectual
development. In essence, current research has suggested that there is more to the parent-child
relationship than that involving the mother and the child").
76. Id. at 356. Miller notes that sole custody will have an impact on the mother/custodial parent.
Id. The custodial mother may become resentful towards both the children and her former spouse
based on the fact that the custody arrangement consumes more of her time and activities than it would
have during marriage. Id. at 356-57. The custodial mother must now do the work normally done by
two parents which may make it more "difficult for the mother to establish a career, to earn a living for
her family, to sever her financial dependence on her ex-spouse, and to cultivate a social life." Id. at
356.
77. Frederic W. ilfeld, Jr. et al., Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of
Relitigation (1982), reprinted in JowNr CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 136, 139-41 (Jay Folberg ed.,
1984). Dr. Frederic Ilfeld, Dr. Holly Ilfeld, and John Alexander, J.D., collected data from the courts
of the West District of Los Angeles County for more than a two year period (1978-1980) and
compared the outcome of relitigation between 276 sole custody arrangements and 138 joint custody
arrangements. Id. at 137. The authors recognized that relitigation is only one factor that indicates
whether a custody arrangement worked but believed that it was an objective measurement reflecting
parental conflict. Id. The study concluded that out of the 414 child custody cases that came through
the court, the proportion of relitigation for joint custody cases was one-half that of sole custody cases.
Id. at 139-40. The authors made two assumptions in their research study: (1) they assumed that
problems with children's adjustment after divorce came more from the amount of conflict and
problems of post-divorce than from the actual divorce itself; and (2) they assumed that relitigation of
custody issues represented a moderate to severe level of conflict between parents and the custody
arrangement, which in turn adversely affects the children of divorce. Id. at 140. The authors' final
conclusions were that, considering the best interests of the child as foremost in importance, "all
professionals should recognize a strong, positive indication for joint custody." Id. Furthermore, the
study stated that the burden of proof that joint custody would not work in the child's best interest should
fall on the parent who is requesting sole custody. Id.
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everyone has embraced joint custody as a welcomed alternative.78 One
of the reasons for this opposition may be the confusion that sometimes
exists about what joint custody is and how courts should apply the
doctrine. 79 Courts have made matters worse by confusing terms and
issues in different custody cases.8 0 For the purposes of this article, the
distinctions to be made will be between joint legal custody and joint
physical custody. Joint legal custody refers to the equal rights of each
parent to be responsible for decisions involving the health and welfare of
their child.8 1 Joint physical custody refers to the time a parent spends
with their child in their day-to-day upbringing. 82
Proponents of the joint custody theory assert many reasons why it is
78. See Scott, supra note 50, at 626-27 (explaining that some feminists may not agree with joint
custody based on a belief that fathers get windfall results under joint custody).
79. See Danece Day Koenigs & Kimberly A. Harris, Child Custody Arrangements: Say What You
Mean, Mean What You Say, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 591, 597-605 (1996) (explaining the confusion
based on courts applying joint, alternating, and split custody in erroneous and ambiguous terms and
describing how each custody situation must be analyzed and broken down between legal and physical
custody). Koenigs and Harris broke down the individual aspects of each type of custody arrangement
which a court determines for child custody at divorce. Id. at 599-605. The following definitions can
be useful when keeping in mind custody arrangements of the court:
Sole Custody: In a sole custody arrangement one parent is given complete legal and
physical custody of the child.
Divided or Alternating Custody: A divided custody arrangement is one in which both
parents are given sole physical custody and legal custody of the child for set durations
during the year, subject to visitation by the non-custodial parent.
Split Custody: Split custody describes an arrangement where there are two or more
children who are literally split or divided between the parents. In such an arrangement,
each parent receives sole physical and legal custody of one or more of the children and
visitation rights to the other children.
Joint Custody: The distinguishing feature of joint custody is that both parents retain legal
responsibility and authority for the care and control of the child, much as in an intact
family. Neither parent's rights are superior; both have an equal voice in education,
upbringing, and the general welfare of the child. The term joint custody has two
components, joint legal custody and joint physical custody.
Id.
80. See Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 125 n.l (N.D. 1980) (stating that the terms "split
custody," "alternating custody," and "joint custody" would be used interchangeably throughout the
opinion); see also Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 966 (Md. 1986) (commenting that the confusion on
what constitutes a joint custody arrangement may be due to the inability of the courts to agree on what
is meant by joint custody). In Taylor, the court stated that inherent in the meaning of "custody" are the
concepts of "legal" and "physical" custody. Id. at 967. Legal custody carries with it the right and
obligation to make decisions in areas ranging from education and religion to discipline and medical
care. Id. Physical custody carries with it the right and obligation to provide a home and daily care to
the child. Id. The court pointed out that joint physical custody does not necessarily mean a fifty-fifty
split of custody but may involve the best possible division of time with each parent. Id. This may mean
that one parent gets custody during the school year and the other during summers or some other
arrangement. Id.
81. See Koenigs & Harris, supra note 79, at 604 (defining joint legal custody as the equal rights
of each parent to make major decisions affecting their child).
82. See id. (defining joint physical custody as the day-to-day participation that each parent has
with the child).
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the best solution for all parties involved. 83 One such reason is that both
joint legal custody and joint physical custody more closely resemble the
custody and control each parent had during marriage. 84 Joint legal and
physical custody may also foster cooperation between parents and
further a societal goal of parental sharing of responsibilities. 85  In
addition, the flexible nature of joint custody is seen as an advantage to
custody arrangements. 86 Finally, the healthy development of both
parent-child relationships ensures that the best interests of the child are
being cared for.87
Opponents of joint custody note that there is always the distinct
possibility that joint custody will not help parental cooperation but may
instead exacerbate any existing conflicts. 88 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has been quick to point out that it cannot control the relationship
between the parents beyond the walls of the court and that the parents
will determine whether or not the relationship is amicable. 89
Opponents of joint custody are also quick to point out that in most
83. See Scott, supra note 50, at 624. Scott discusses several reasons or theories that have been
asserted in the past as positive rationale for joint custody. Id. First, she states that as gender roles have
evolved and changed with society, fathers have become more involved with caring for their children.
Id. Second, sole custody arrangements relegate the non-custodial parent to the role of "visitor" and
take away parental authority. Id. Conversely, joint custody more accurately replicates or reflects
modern family roles. Id.
84. See Koenigs & Harris, supra note 79, at 604 (citing Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, Joint
Custody Of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. D Avis L. REV. 523, 525 (1979) (stating that during
marriage parents do not assign authority or responsibility for the children)).
85. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 50, at 625 (stating that proponents of joint custody promote
egalitarian gender roles and promote the best interests of children by having fathers and mothers
involved in the child's custody).
86. See Miller, supra note 12, at 361-62. Miller points out that the flexibility of joint custody is
one of the key elements that makes the arrangement work. Id. He states that, "[tihere may be times
when a child needs the constant attention and affection of his [or her] mother, others when his [or her]
father's masculine image is of primary importance. Furthermore not only the child but the parents and
their relationships may change." Id. at 361. Finally, it is the parents who determine the living
schedules of the parents and children, not the courts. Id. at 361-62. See also Persia Woolley, Shared
Parenting Arrangements (1978), reprinted in JoINT CusToDY AND SHARED PARENTING, 16, 16-24 (Jay
Folberg ed., 1984). Woolley defined "shared custody" as any type of custody which allows a child to
grow up knowing and interacting with each parent on a frequent or even daily basis. Id. at 17. The
shared custody could come in many forms, such as a fifty-fifty split or the children living with each
parent for several years or more. Id. The overall result was the important factor to Woolley, that the
flexibility allowed the children the "opportunity for a more realistic, normal relationship with each
parent." Id. Additionally, shared custody allowed the parents to feel that they had a chance to pass on
their own beliefs and standards on to the child. Id.
87. See Miller, supra note 12, at 362 (stating "several recent studies have concluded that the best
conditions for continued development [of children], require the deep involvement of both parents").
88. See Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 971 (Md. 1986) (discussing joint custody arrangements
as inappropriate when parents lack any spirit of cooperation). The court stated in Taylor that joint
custody may present an opportunity for the child to manipulate the parents. Id. at 970.
89. See Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 131 (1980) (stating that courts cannot help develop a
healthy parent-child relationship nor can they regulate the day-to-day happenings between the parent
and child).
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families the daily care of the children is not equally proportionate. 90
Therefore, joint custody gives "windfall" rights to a parent who has not
invested as much time with the child as the other parent and then forces a
dissatisfied parent to make certain concessions, usually financial, to
obtain an acceptable custody arrangement. 9 1 Finally, a criticism of joint
custody is that it may create confusion and instability for children of
divorce at a time when they need a sense of certainty in their lives.92
The important part to remember about the joint custody theory is
that it does not evaluate parental roles based on the quantitative weight of
which parent has cooked for the children more or which parent has
brought in more income to the family and children. Instead, the theory
focuses on the qualitative importance in a child's development of having
both parents providing care. 93
The common theme that runs through child custody theories, from
primary caregiver to joint custody, and through much of the common
law is a general interest in finding uniformity in child custody cases. 94
Instead of basing child custody decisions on ambiguous, unweighted
factors or misconceived notions, most courts and scholars seem to agree
that the best way to decide custody is by a certain criteria which would
let parents, children, and the courts know how custody disputes will be
solved.95
90. See Scott, supra note 50, at 627 (stating mothers often spend more time childrearing than do
fathers).
91. Id.
92. Taylor, 508 A.2d at 970.
93. Compare supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing factors which go into the
reasoning for primary caregiver) with supra notes 66-69 and 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing
-the reasoning behind joint custody).
94. See Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 130. The court in Lapp pointed out that there is "no general
agreement among courts, lawyers, psychologists, behavioral scientists, social workers, or other
professionals in the family law field" in regards to the desirability of joint custody. Id. That same
disagreement is evident 16 years later with no harmony between family law experts and the courts as
to which child custody theory acts in the best interests of the child. See also supra notes 58-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the need for primary caregiver); supra notes 65-86 and accompanying
text (discussing reasons for joint custody).
95. See, e.g., Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 130. The court in Lapp stated:
Over the past few years, we have become aware of a mounting clamor for changes in
the laws pertaining to child custody. The discussion about the complexities of custody
and visitation in our changing society has spurred the publication of a number of books,
articles, and treatises throughout the country.
Id.; see also supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing best interest of the child);
supra notes 58-95 and accompanying text (discussing the primary caregiver and joint custody).
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III. NORTH DAKOTA'S CHILD CUSTODY DEVELOPMENT
A. THE PARENTING ROLE IN NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the marriage
relationship is one of equality.9 6 Justice Levine has commented that
"this court shares the enlightened view of the marriage rela-
tionship-that marriage is a partnership enterprise, a joint venture, to
which each party contributes his and her efforts and skills, as agreed
upon, either or both within or without the home." 97 The North Dakota
legislature has also codified the idea of equality in the marriage,
particularly in the area of child care. 98 The statute states that, "The
husband and father and wife and mother have equal rights with regard to
the care, custody, education, and control of the children of the
marriage." 99 The statute for awarding custody also indicates no
preference for one parent over the other.lOO However, once a divorce has
taken place, statistics seem to indicate that the rights of parents, in
maintaining custody of their children, are often violated.101 Opponents
of joint custody solutions are quick to point out that many sole child
custody awards were done by stipulation. 102 However, when focusing on
96. See Erickson v. Erickson, 384 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1986) (Levine, J., concurring) (commenting
that marriage is a partnership and joint venture).
97. Id. In Erickson, the court discussed the division of marital property. Id. at 660-61. The court
stated that although one party may not have contributed the same amount of effort in being the primary
income earner, that party still deserves an equitable distribution of the property. Id. The question
arises, if the argument as stated with that logic is true, would the converse also be true: that the parent
who has provided the primary income to the marriage has assisted the other parent in being the
primary caretaker? Since it is an equal partnership, even if one parent has done more in the area of
child rearing, is the other parent entitled to an equal allowance of the right to be a parent under the
law?
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06 (1991).
99. Id.
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1992).
101. A Difference in Perceptions: The Final Report of the North Dakota Commission on Gender
Fairness in the Courts, 72 N.D. L. REV. 1113, 1177-78 (1996). The Domestic Law Committee
reviewed 155 random, unappealed divorce judgments from six judicial districts. Id. at 1177 n.140.
The draft committee readily admits that the sample size was small and may not provide a sound basis
for conclusions for domestic law analysis but the empirical data may at least pose some insight as to
distribution of custody cases. Id. Of the 155 divorces, mothers received primary physical custody
73.7% of the time. Id. at 1178. In 99 of the 155 cases, minor children were involved. Id. In the 99
cases, fathers received primary physical custody in only 10 or 9.9% of the cases. Id. Mothers
received primary physical custody in 73 cases or 75.1%. Joint or split physical custody was awarded
in 16 cases or 15%. Id. Of the 99 cases joint legal custody was awarded in 58 cases or 58.6%. Id.
Legal custody to the mother was granted in 36 cases or 36.4 % and to fathers in 5 cases or 5%. Id.
102. Id. at 1179. In 52% of the cases in which the mother received sole custody of minor
children, that decision was carried out by parental stipulation. Id. At the same time a problem exists
where many parents are not able to rightfully obtain some type of custody of their children, parents
should not be able to use divorce to get out of the duties and responsibilities of parenting. Just as the
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constitutional protections in North Dakota for custody and control of
one's children it does not seem that the courts have protected the
individual liberty interests which the United States Supreme Court spoke
of in Stanley v. Illinois.103
B. NORTH DAKOTA'S USE OF JOINT CUSTODY
The North Dakota Supreme Court's use of joint custody has been
intermittent and apparently invoked on a case by case basis. In 1975,
the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the issue of joint custody in
DeForest v. DeForest. 10 4 DeForest involved a joint custody arrangement
where the trial court awarded the mother physical custody for the
remaining four months of that year and then to the father for six months
of the next year and then back to the mother for six months. 105 The
mother commenced an action on appeal for sole custody of her child.106
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that a best interests of the child
standard had not been applied in the lower court and remanded the case
for further findings.1 07 Although the court in DeForest reversed and
legislature has properly found that parents cannot stipulate to child support payments below a certain
level, so too should they find that parents cannot stipulate to no longer functioning in the capacity of a
parent to their child.
103. The Supreme Court in Stanley stated that "[w]e observe that the State registers no gain
towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents." Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1972); see also supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (explaining
the individual rights protected by the Constitution which give parents custody and control over their
own children).
104. 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975). In DeForest, Margaret DeForest appealed from a judgment
of the district court of Burleigh County, which provided alternating or split custody of their child Peggy
between herself and her former husband Patrick DeForest. DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919,
921-22 (N.D. 1975). Patrick and Margaret were living in Bismarck where both were employed as
teachers until the time of separation. Id. at 921. At the time of the divorce Margaret and the children
were living in Grand Forks. Id. The court provided no findings as to whether one parent was
responsible for a greater share of the child care duties. Id. The court did cite to the record in finding
that the divorce was based on irreconcilable differences, and also concerning Margaret's respon-
sibilities as a mother to Peggy and Margaret's employment outside the home. Id. Both parents were
extremely bitter toward each other and allowed those problems to spill over into the custody situation.
Id. at 922.
105. Id. The district court made the findings of fact, specifically authorizing joint custody. Id.
The lower court, although stating that the arrangement was for joint custody, authorized an alternating
custody arrangement. Id. The court found that Margaret would be awarded custody of Peggy from
the day of the trial until January 12, 1975. Id. Peggy would then live with Patrick from January 12,
1975, until Memorial Day, 1975. Id. Both Patrick and Margaret would get seven weeks of custody
during the summer, along with visitation during non-custody times, and allowances for alternating
custody during holidays. Id.
106. Id. Patrick DeForest argued that the split custody decision was not clearly erroneous and
should be maintained. Id. In the alternative, he requested that sole custody go to him if the court
determined that split custody was not in the best interests of Peggy. Id.
107. Id. at 924-25. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the trial court had made no
indication, in either the findings on custody or the oral opinion, that a split custody arrangement would
act in the best interests of Peggy. Id. at 924. During oral argument before the supreme court the
attorneys for both sides indicated that an inference or presumption of best interests of the child could
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remanded the case back to the trial court for further findings, the court
stated that if there is substantial evidence to support a party's position
for "alternating custody" that party may be able to show that it is in the
best interests to have the child spending time with both parents.lOS The
court also stated that between two parents all things should be considered
equal.109 The court went on to state that a finding that joint custody is in
the best interests of the child would not be found to be clearly erroneous
when supported by proper facts.110
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not issue another joint
custody decision for five years until Lapp v. Lapp,"'l in which the court
looked at a joint custody arrangement rotating custody between the
husband and wife every six months.12 The court not only determined
the fitness of each parent, but seemed intent on reviewing the husband-
wife relationship and characteristics of each person to determine the best
custody arrangement."l 3 Differentiating from the DeForest case, the
court in Lapp found that the district court's memorandum opinion
outlined sufficient factors to allow for joint custody.114 The court in
Lapp upheld the custody arrangement, finding that both parents were fit,
be made from the lower court's opinion. Id.
The supreme court was not satisfied that the lower court had taken the best interests of child
into consideration, although some findings from the district court records indicated the judge was
concerned with the best interests of the child. Id. at 924-25. The trial court had stated that its position
was the predominate concern for the welfare of the child and not the welfare of either of the parents.
Id. at 924.
108. Id. at 925.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 924. The court stated that in the findings of fact it was looking to determine whether
the trial court had analyzed the best interests of the child in determining custody. Id. The appellate
court stated that it wanted to be able to obtain a correct understanding of the factual issues determined
by the trial court as a basis for the conclusions of law. Id.
111. 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980).
112. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 124 (N.D. 1980). Lynette and Dale Lapp were divorced in
Burleigh County on November 5, 1979. Id. Their eight year marriage produced one daughter, Trina
Lapp. Id. Although the court called the custody arrangement a split custody or alternate custody
arrangement, the make-up of the custody order is one that would be joint custody. Id. Lynette would
have custody for a period of six months each year, beginning with the first of August and ending the
first day of February, with custody then switching to Dale. Id. The order also provided for visitation
and custody on holidays. Id. Lynette brought an appeal and requested an order for stay of judgment
for joint custody. Id.
113. Id. at 126-28. The court was very specific in its discussion of both Lynette and Dale's age,
physical and mental health, education, and employment. Id. The court reviewed the important role
that both sets of grandparents played in Trina's life. Id. at 126. The court also reviewed the expert
testimony which had been presented in the district court. Id. Lynette brought two experts in the field
of family counseling. Id. The experts determined that Trina was a well-adjusted and happy child and
stated that Lynette was a very capable and competent mother. Id. The experts had never met or
spoken with Dale or formed an opinion of him as a parent. Id. at 127. Dale brought in a family friend
to testify as to his fitness as a parent. Id. She stated that both parents loved Trina but that she thought
Dale would "provide a more stable, disciplined, organized home." Id.
114. Id. at 128.
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capable, and deserving of custody of their child.1l5 The court further
stated that when the evidence supports joint custody, it will be in the best
interests of the child to follow that standard.116 The factors used by the
court in Lapp could be used as criteria in other joint custody cases.
The supreme court in Lapp also outlined how joint physical custody
arrangements may be worked out without having an equal division of
time.117 The court also discussed the reality of little or no agreement as
to the effects of joint custody by the courts, psychologists, or social
workers.l1 8 However, the court pointed out that no one wins in divorce
and the object of custody is to make the adjustment for the children as
least stressful as possible. 119 What the court emphasized was the impor-
tance of the parents cooperating, dealing with post-divorce life, and
trying to make the custody arrangements work.120
115. Id. at 129. The district court found both Lynette and Dale to be fit, willing, and able parents.
Id. at 124. The findings of the court stated that Trina's custody would be divided equally between the
parents. Id.
116. Id. at 128. The court extracted particularly important district court findings that:
1) Both parties expressed a strong desire to retain custody of the minor child, and both
suggested that the child should be afforded liberal visitation with the noncustodial parent
and with the respective grandparents ....
2) Both parties demonstrated that they are capable of raising the child in a stable and
satisfactory environment, and of providing for her physical and emotional needs.
3) The expert witnesses who testified at trial ... [were not qualified] to form an opinion
as to which parent was the preferred custodial parent because neither witness had
sufficient professional involvement with the [father].
4) The expert witness who had been ordered by the district court to conduct a custody
investigation testified that both [parents] were "suitable custodial parents."
5) The work hours and routine of both parents are such that child care will be suitable at
both homes.
6) The logistics are such that there will be no substantial disruption of the child's routine,
schooling, etc. Both parents are of close geographical proximity, i.e., both reside and
work in [the same town].
7) Both maternal and paternal grandparents reside in [the same town] ....
8) The [mother] has been inflexible and uncooperative in allowing Dale and his parents
to see Trina during the interim period.
Id. at 128-29.
117. Id. at 129. Joint custody theories support the idea that there does not need to be an equal
fifty-fifty split of physical custody, in fact, the court in Lapp suggested options other than a six month
split of custody. Id.; see also Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (1986) (discussing the flexibility of
joint custody arrangements and the fact that they do not have to be even fifty-fifty splits of custody).
In Lapp, the court discussed the possibilities of a division of custody where one parent had the child
during the school year and the other during the summer months. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 129. Another
possibility was giving the child a home for one full year with one parent and the next year with the
other. Id. However, the court found that the trial court did not err in its discretion of awarding joint
custody based on every six months. Id.
118. Id. at 130.
119. Id. at 130-31. The district court in Lapp stated that "[tihe reality is that in some cases joint
custody is the least detrimental of the alternatives available." Id. at 129.
120. Id. at 130. The court emphasized that, with an adversarial approach to divorce, where the
child becomes the focus of conflict, negative attitudes will continue to promulgate and the ultimate
loser will be the innocent child in the middle. Id.
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The court, in 1989, held true to the Lapp precedent in upholding a
joint custody award to the parents of a child in Kaloupek v. Burfening.121
In Kaloupek the court looked at a joint custody arrangement which gave
each parent legal and physical custody.122 The court discussed the
importance of both parent's contribution to their child's upbringing.123
The court also pointed out the equal rights of parents in North Dakota to
the custody and control of their children.124 Analyzing the child's care
under the factors of section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century.
Code, the court showed it was obvious that both parents loved and cared
for their child and were capable as parents.' 25 The North Dakota
Supreme Court further stated that in order to give the child the benefit of
both parent's contribution, it would be in his best interest to have shared
legal and physical custody. 126 Finally, the court pointed out that the
success of any custody arrangement is determined by the parents.127 It
is impossible for courts to administer and supervise a custody arrange-
ment on the day-to-day level.128
C. THE PRIMARY CAREGIVER IN NORTH DAKOTA CASE LAW
North Dakota first considered the primary caregiver theory in
Gravning v. Gravning.129 Gravning involved a split custody decision
which gave one child to the father and the other child to the mother. 130
121. 440 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1989).
122. Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 497 (N.D. 1989). Chris Kaloupek and Michael
Burfening had lived together but were never married. Id. They had one child together, Robert, who
was two years old at the time of the custody proceedings. Id.
123. Id. at 498.
124. Id. at 497 (citing Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986)).
125. Id. at 498-99. The court did not apply factors from Lapp. Id. Rather, it analyzed the joint
custody award through the statutory factors. Id. The court found that both Chris and Michael loved
Robert and wished to have custody of him. Id. at 498. Both Chris and Michael had the disposition and
capacity to give Robert the necessary affection and guidance he needed, along with providing for the
necessities of life. Id. The court in Kaloupek determined that there was sufficient evidence by the
district court to conclude that joint custody was proper and necessary. Id.
126. Id. Chris argued for sole custody based on the fact that she had been Robert's primary
caregiver. Id. at 497. Chris argued that statutory factors four and five of section 14-09-06.1 were
given inadequate consideration because, as the primary caregiver, she had maintained a stable and
satisfactory environment and the permanence of the family unit weighed in her favor. Id. at 498-99.
The supreme court agreed with the trial court's finding that both parents had played a role in
Robert's upbringing and the importance of maintaining continuity was not with the primary caregiver
but with both parents. Id. at 499. The maintaining of continuity would best be served by allowing each
parent to "open his [or] her home to Robert, alternately sharing in the responsibility of providing the
day to day care, love, and nurture that physical custody entails." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986).
130. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1986). Greg and Nancy Gravning were
divorced in 1985. Id. The trial court gave Gabriel to Greg and Amanda to Nancy with "joint
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Although the trial court found that each parent was equally fit to have
custody, it decided that split custody would fulfill the individual needs of
the children.131 One of the major concerns of the court was the fact that
Mrs. Gravning was not cooperative in promoting visitation between the
children and Mr. Gravning while she had custody of the children. 132
Justice Levine dissented, stating that she thought the children should be
placed with their mother, who was the primary caregiver.133 Justice
Levine argued that where two equally fit parents seek custody, North
Dakota should adopt the rule that the primary caregiver receives
custody.134 She believed that splitting custody raised more questions
than it answered and she asserted that preserving the intimate bond
between the primary caregiver and the child would better maintain the
best interests of the child.135
The Gravning case is a good example of where joint custody would
have worked in the best interests of the children. 136 By applying the
Lapp factors,137 the trial court could have found a custody arrangement
which would have kept the two children together. Both parties expressed
a strong desire to have custody of both children.138 Instead of splitting
visitation" taking place two days a month. Id. Nancy appealed contending that she should have
custody of both children because she had been the children's primary caregiver. Id.
131. Id. at 623-24. At trial the adversarial procedure pitted Nancy and Greg against each other,
with the majority of their efforts going to show how each would be a better parent than the other. Id.
at 623. The district court found that "each of Nancy Gravning and Greg Gravning are competent and
capable parents and that each shall have equal standing in the eyes of the law." Id. The court then
agreed to split the children between the two parents. Compare Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 624, with
Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 497 (finding that both parents are fit, loving parents, who both play an
important role in the child's life and therefore the proper custody order is for joint custody), and
Thorlaksen v. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d 770, 774 (N.D. 1990) (finding that both parents were fit and
loving and that the court fairly weighed the evidence between two fit parents and properly determined
sole custody as being in the best interests of the child).
132. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 623.
133. Id. at 625 (Levine, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 624 (citing Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981)).
135. Id. at 625. Justice Levine stated that the awarding of custody is one of the most difficult
decisions a judge can face but when they order splitting of custody between two parents, judges should
be required to explain in a particularized fashion their findings and conclusions. Id. at 624.
136. Id. Although Greg and Nancy were unable to get along with each other and did not show
that they could maintain an amicable relationship, that should be only one factor in the consideration of
joint custody. See Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 128-29 (N.D. 1980) (stating factors which the court
used to determine whether joint custody was a feasible alternative, including: whether both parents
desired custody; whether both parents had demonstrated that each was capable of raising the child;
whether the parents' work hours and routine were suitable to joint custody; and whether the logistics
were such that no real disruption in the child's routine, school, or other activities would occur).
137. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (referring to factors which would help in
deciding if joint custody is feasible in a particular child custody case).
138. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 622. The court's findings as to both Greg and Nancy were very
limited, but the court determined that the factors in North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.1 had
been satisfied. Id. at 622-23. The fact that each parent received custody of one child also suggests
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custody between the parents and denying the other the right of parenting
that child, it would have seemed a better solution for the court to allow
both parents to have control and influence in their children's lives.139
The fact that both parents did not live that great of a distance away from
each other would have allowed for some type of joint legal and physical
custody arrangement.140
Three years after the Gravning decision, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's joint physical custody award to both parents in Kaloupek
v. Burfening. 141 Justice Levine filed a dissent and asked the court to give
custody to the mother as the primary caregiver.142 Justice Levine
adamantly argued that the court had made a mistake in trying to pre-
serve the father's relationship with his child along with the mother's. 143
Justice Levine stated that an explicit preference for one parent over the
other would protect the child's psychological relationships.144
Justice Levine made no mention of the psychological bonding that
a child may have with both parents or the fact that a parent would be
able to provide nurturing without being the person who has done the
cooking or cleaning.' 4 5 Instead, she focused completely on the premise
that the only parent who could provide the child with a stable upbringing
would be the primary caregiver.146 This apparently would shift the focus
of child rearing into a quantitative evaluation to see who has changed
more diapers, bathed the child more, or gotten up to give more bottles to
the baby.1 47 Instead the focus should be on whether the father or
that each parent was deemed capable of providing a stable and satisfactory environment for each
child. Id.
139. Compare Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 623-24, with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(stating that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children is a vital liberty interest to be protected).
140. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 623.
141. See supra notes 121-28 (discussing the Kaloupek case). The majority for the court found
that a joint legal and physical custody arrangement would serve the best interests of the child by giving
access to both parents to provide care and support to their child. Id. at 498.
142. Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 499 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting). Justice
Levine opened her dissent with "Poor Robert!" to express her dismay at having the child in this case
under a joint custody arrangement. Id. Justice Levine called the situation a "custodial schizophrenia"
and classified the joint custody as a four year probationary period. Id. Justice Levine went on to
chastise the court for not "biting the bullet" and awarding custody to one parent. Id.
143. Id. at 499-500.
144. Id. at 501. Justice Levine stated that a message had been sent out by the court that alarmed
her as to the future of child custody in North Dakota. Id. She continued by stating that other circum-
spect jurisdictions had held joint custody was correct only where there was parental agreement, but
failed to mention the number of jurisdictions which use joint custody as a guideline for custody. See id.
at 500-01.
145. See supra. notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of nurturing and
bonds between a child and both parents).
146. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 502.
147. See supra note 59 (discussing Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) and the
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mother is fit to parent a child.148 The analysis should look at whether
one parent is incapable of providing discipline, love, or other nurturing
qualities, not whether one parent has not done as much caretaking for
the child in the past.149
Justice Levine argued in Kaloupek that joint custody should be used
sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. 150 Justice Levine also
described joint custody as the "antithesis of Solomonic."l1l She stated
that even Solomon had not given the parents of the child a choice of
joint custody, but instead forced them to make a decision based on the
health and welfare of the child.152 Justice Levine stated that Solomon's
acute wisdom did not let the parent's off the hook by resorting to joint
custody 53 However, what the majority in Kaloupek seemingly tried to
do was find a solution which acted in the best interests of the child and
still maintained the continuity of parenting from both parents.154
Again in 1989, Justice Levine dissented in Dinius v. Dinius,155
where a father had received sole custody of the four children from the
marriage.156 Although both parents were found to be fit by the trial
factors which go into evaluating which parent has serviced the child by cooking, cleaning, and bathing
the child, and in turn who would be the primary caregiver).
148. N.D. CNTr. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (Supp. 1995); see also infra app. (suggesting that a parent
could only be denied joint custody if the factors in deciding the best interests of the child are rebutted
against that parent).
149. Id. § 14-09-06.2; see also Miller, supra note 12, at 357 (noting that the awarding of one
parent as superior and giving them custody is disruptive and that custody should be a plan for the
future and not a reward for the past).
150. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 501.
151. Id. at 501-02. Justice Levine mistakenly invokes Solomon's wisdom as a basis for not
allowing joint custody. Id. Justice Levine misunderstands the story of Solomon as being between two
biological parents or that King Solomon in some way allowed the parents to make a choice for the
health and welfare of the child. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the wisdom of
Solomon in discovering the identity of the biological mother). Instead, the reality of the situation was
that the biological mother was trying to prevent her child from being cut in half because another
vindictive mother wanted it done. Id.
152. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 502. Again, Justice Levine mistakenly favored piecemealing the
Solomon parable into a fashionable resolution that joint custody was not a proper child custody
arrangement. But see Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981) (suggesting the potential
for a phenomenon known as the "Solomon syndrome" where the parent who may be in the position of
the primary caregiver would be willing to sacrifice everything else in order to avoid the prospect of
losing the child in an unpredictable court trial). The Garska court compared the harlot in the Solomon
story, who was willing to give up her child to save him from being cut in half, to a sacrificing parent of
today who may lose support or alimony payments in a custody battle to ensure that their parent-child
relationship is maintained. Id.
153. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 502.
154. Id at 499 (recognizing the importance of cooperation and the child's development with both
parents through joint custody).
155. 448 N.W.2d 210, 217 (N.D. 1989).
156. Dinius v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210, 210 (N.D. 1989). John and Carmen Dinius were married
in 1975 and divorced in 1987. Id. at 210-11. Their marriage produced four children. Although both
Carmen and John had been working prior to the marriage, after they had children Carmen became a
stay-at-home mom and John was the income earner. Id. After a drawn out divorce, the court decided
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court and the supreme court, Justice Levine dissented in favor of the
primary caregiver.157 In Dinius, the court, for the first time, was asked to
evaluate the primary caregiver in relation to specific sections in the
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.2 to determine if granting
custody to the primary caregiver would be in the best interests of the
child.158 Justice Levine stated that even if custody to the primary
caregiver did not have presumptive force it was still a major factor in
considering who deserved custody.159 Justice Levine argued that
stability needed to be maintained and that stability came from the child
being with his or her primary caregiver. 160 She argued that a stable and
satisfactory environment meant more than a continuing job held by the
father.161 Finally, Justice Levine interpreted "custodial home" to mean
not just the house itself, but the emotional attachment between family
members. 162
Joint custody would have alleviated many of the questions that
Justice Levine had as far as who was most deserving of custody. 163 In
Dinius, both parents had proven to be fit and ready to accept the
responsibilities of parenting.164  Both had worked in the daily main-
that custody of all four children would go to John. Id. at 211. Carmen appealed claiming that it was
erroneous for the court to give custody to John. Id.
157. Id. at 217 (Levine, J., dissenting). Although Justice Levine argued that Carmen was the
primary caregiver, there was some question as to who actually had fulfilled that job. Id. at 218. The
trial court noted the fact that Mr. Dinius was involved with the "grocery shopping, bathing, occasional
school conferences, discipline, and in entertaining the children." Id. at 213. In addition, John was
responsible for caring for the children when they were sick as well as being the parent responsible for
discipline. Id.
158. Id at 212. Carmen claimed that the trial courts findings were erroneous because it had not
properly weighed the best interests of the child factors under section 14-09-06.2. Id. Carmen stated
that the trial court needed to focus greater attention on factor four, the length of time in a stable
environment; and factor five, the permanence of the family unit and custodial home under section
14-09-06.2. Id. at 211-12.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 218.
161. Id. A joint custody proponent might argue that Justice Levine is correct in stating that a
continuing job does not ensure custody, but what should factor into custody is whether the father and
the mother have the capacity to provide love and nurturance to their children. The court found that
"both parents love their children, and the children love them, [bloth parents are willing and capable of
acting as the custodial parent." Id. at 213.
162. Id. at 218 (stating that the permanence of the family unit meant home is where the heart is
and that should give the primary caregiver a stronger presumption because of the emotional bonds).
163. See supra notes 66-86 and accompanying text (discussing joint custody). Once again, Dinius
is a good example of how the adversarial system does not benefit custody arrangements. Dinius, 448
N.W.2d at 213. The court specifically found that much of the parents' efforts at trial were leveling
criticisms at each other and trying to prove that the other lacked the capacity for parenting. Id. The
court found that none of their animosity or negative statements helped in deciding custody. Id.
164. Id. There had been some question as to John's mental health and well-being. Id. at 214.
John had suffered from a bout of depression and suicidal tendencies. Id. John sought help from a
hospital and received medication which helped to relieve the problem. Id. The court determined that
John had overcome any problems he had and from the standpoint of a stable environment, that John
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tenance of the children as far as bathing, cooking, disciplining, and
general care of the children. 165 In addition, both were capable of
providing the love and nurturing necessary to raise children. 166 If joint
custody had been granted in this case, Mrs. Dinius would not have been
denied the right to care for her children.
In Foreng v. Foreng, 167 the court was again faced with the difficult
question of child custody between two fit parents. 168 Justice Levine,
writing for the majority, found that the trial court was not clearly errone-
ous by focusing on the primary caregiver status to establish who should
have custody.169 The court stated that section 14-09-06.2 of the North
Dakota Century Code was the checklist used by the courts to determine
the best interests of the child and that part of that determination was to
figure out who was the primary caregiver. 170 The court reasoned that the
substantial impact the primary caregiver has on the child makes it a
proper focus for child custody determinations.171 At no time, however,
did the court mention any possible constitutional protection for the right
of parenting one's own children.172
IV. NORTH DAKOTA'S LOSS OF DUAL PARENTING AFTER
FORENG
The theories behind joint custody and the primary caregiver are
distinct and powerful ideas each heading in different directions. With
the primary caregiver theory, the idea is that one parent is the "main"
parent and deserves sole custody to preserve his or her relationship with
had the better of the situations. Id. The court affirmed the order and sole custody of all four children
remained with John. Id. at 217.
165. Id. at 213.
166. Id.
167. 509 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 1993).
168. Foreng v. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38, 39-40 (N.D. 1993). In a rather short but important
opinion, the court decided the issue of custody of the two children of David and Rita Foreng. Id.
David and Rita were married in December of 1985 and were divorced six years later, in December of
1991. Id. at 39. The lower court awarded custody of the children to Rita. Id. David appealed stating
that the trial court erred by considering which spouse was the primary caregiver. Id. at 40.
169. Id. Justice Levine wrote that the trial court could not decide custody on the primary
caregiver factor alone, but that the court should determine who the primary caregiver was and could
use that as afocus for custody. Id. (emphasis added).
170. Id. (stating that the trial court was not improper in determining the primary caregiver or
using it as the main focus in determining custody under best interests of the child test); see also supra
notes 7-8 (providing the text of section 14-09-06.2).
171. Id. (citing Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 98 (N.D. 1990) and Roen v. Roen, 438
N.W.2d 170, 174 (N.D. 1989), which determined that established patterns of care and nurture are
relevant factors, which along with continuity of the child's relationship with the closest parent, make it
lawful to focus on the primary caregiver)).
172. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (acknowledging an individual's constitutional
right to parent his or her own children).
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the children. Joint custody recognizes that both parents have created
psychological bonds with their children that should be maintained. This
last section will analyze two cases where joint legal and physical custody
had been awarded to the parents. In both cases the trial court changed
custody, based on the fact that the joint physical custody arrangement
had not been working, and awarded one parent sole custody of the
children. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision in both
cases. What seems important to the analysis is the material weight given
to the primary caregiver status in determining whether to overturn a joint
custody arrangement.
In Dalin v. Dalin, 173 the court had before it a joint physical custody
arrangement that had unquestionably broken down. 174 The trial court
found that sole custody was proper because joint custody had not
worked between the parents. 175 The court resolved the issue by giving
the child to Mrs. Dalin.176 Mr. Dalin appealed, claiming that the best
interests of the child would be that the girl live with her father. 177 Justice
Levine, writing for the majority, found that the court could not make a
determination as to who was the primary caregiver based on the "con-
stant shifting of the child" back and forth since the divorce. 178 The trial
court determined that the best interests of the child would be served by
173. 512 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1994).
174. Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 687 (N.D. 1994). Roland and Patricia Dalin were married
in 1989 and divorced in 1992. Id. at 686. They had one child from the marriage. Id. Upon divorce,
Roland and Patricia agreed to joint custody of their child on a rotating basis, with Patricia having the
child in September, November, January, March, and half of July. Id. at 687. Roland was to have her
the other months. Id. at 686. Both Roland and Patricia determined that the custody arrangement had
not been working as planned. Id. at 687. They stipulated that a "significant change of circumstances
necessitating a change of custody" had occurred. Id., see also supra note 86 and accompanying text
(defining joint custody and describing the benefits of this custody arrangement as being flexible and
allowing the parties to change when the arrangement calls for such action, without having to involve
the court system every time).
175. Compare Id., with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also supra notes 38-44
(finding the rights of both parents as a protected liberty interest in the continued access to his or her
own child).
176. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d at 689. Roland moved for sole physical custody of the child but the court
awarded custody to Patricia. Id. at 687. Some confusion may come from the opinion in that the court
did not define what type of custody it gave to Patricia. Although Roland had moved for sole custody,
most likely the court meant to give Patricia physical custody and not eliminate joint legal custody
between the two. In addition, the court actually provided a modified joint physical custody
arrangement, by way of giving Patricia custody during the school year and giving Roland custody
during the summer months. Id.; see also Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (1986) (noting that a
physical custody split does not have to be a fifty-fifty in the amount of time spent with the child).
177. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d at 687. The court noted, similar to Lapp and Kaloupek, that "both
parents care deeply for the child and are fit parents for custody." Id. at 688. The court still found that
joint custody would not be in the best interests of the child and awarded custody to Patricia. Id.
178. Id. By Mr. Dalin's account and testimony entered at the trial court, he had the children
approximately 70% of the time compared to Mrs. Dalin's 30%. Id. Mrs. Dalin testified that it was
more like a 60%-40% split in favor of Mr. Dalin. Id.
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sole custody with Mrs. Dalin.179 In stating that it could not determine
which parent had been the primary caregiver, the court pointed out that
there may be more than just a mathematical computation of days spent
with a parent to figure out the primary caregiver.180
Justice Levine's opinion seems to inexplicably weaken the impor-
tance of determining the primary caregiver as a primary factor.l81 One
explanation may be that in joint custody arrangements there is no room
for the primary caregiver status. 182 It may also be that neither parent has
a presumptive right to custody and joint custody is the best determinant
for the interests of the child.183 Possibly, the goals of joint custody are
beginning to be fulfilled, as gender roles are changing and both parents
are taking a more active role in child care.184
The problems with the Dalin decision are only exacerbated by the
inconsistency of the court in the case of Schneider v. Livingston. 185 In
Schneider, the court again looked at a failed joint custody arrange-
ment. 186 Although both parents had essentially agreed that the current
custody arrangement was not working, neither wanted to give up their
parental rights to the children. 187 The trial court this time determined
179. Id. at 687. The court also agreed with the trial court that another major concern was
whether Mr. Dalin would help to maintain the future relationship between the child and Mrs. Dalin.
Id. at 688. This was based on the fact that Mr. Dalin had shown unyielding disapproval of Mrs.
Dalin's parenting skills. Id.
180. Id.
181. But cf. Dinius v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210, 217 (N.D. 1989) (dissenting in favor of the
primary caregiver); Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 499 (N.D. 1989) (dissenting in favor of
the primary caregiver); Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 624 (N.D. 1986) (dissenting in favor
of the primary caregiver).
182. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d at 688 (stating that when there is substantially shared custody it may be
difficult to determine that one parent enjoyed the advantage of being the primary caregiver). See also
supra note 65 and accompanying text (pointing out that a primary caregiver may be hard to determine
where there has been significant shared or joint custody).
183. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional right of
parenting).
184. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 50, at 625 (stating that the goal of joint custody is to promote
egalitarian gender roles and the best interests of children).
185. 543 N.w.2d 228 (N.D. 1996). Bruce Livingston and Angela Schneider had three children
from their previous marriage. Schneider v. Livingston, 543 N.W.2d 228, 230 (N.D. 1996). After their
divorce both agreed to joint legal custody as well as joint physical custody. Id. The arrangement they
settled on was that each would get physical custody of the children three and a half days of the week.
Id. Both parties moved for sole custody of the children and the court awarded custody to Angela. Id.
186. Id. at 228. Similar to Dalin, both parties in Schneider had stipulated that the custody
arrangement had not been working and that each parent desired sole custody of the children. Id. But
see note 86 and accompanying text (stating that one of the major benefits of joint custody is the
flexibility of the custody arrangement and the ability to determine the most suitable arrangement for
the parents and child).
187. Schneider, 543 N.W.2d at 230. Bruce stated that this particular arrangement had not been
working based on the continual shuffling of the children back and forth. Id. Angela agreed that the
"custody arrangement was not completely satisfactory." Id (emphasis added). It would not have
been beyond the courts power to maintain the agreed upon joint legal custody and also to have
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that Mrs. Schneider was more the primary caregiver than Mr. Livingston
in the joint custody arrangement.' 8 8 Neither the trial court nor the
supreme court made any real mention of Mr. Livingston's ability to be a
parent or his fitness to have custody. 189 Both courts, instead, focused on
the fact that Mr. Livingston could not remember some of his children's
teachers names. 190 There was also evidence that Mr. Livingston had not
washed as many clothes as Mrs. Schneider had for the children.191 For
these reasons, the court took away Mr. Livingston's right to continue to
act as a parent to his child.192
V. APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION FOR JOINT CUSTODY
As stated earlier, most scholars and courts would agree that stability
and consistency are what child custody determinations need desper-
ately.193 By applying a presumption for joint legal custody of children,
the constitutional rights of both parents are protected, the best interests
of the child are served by still having both parents responsible for their
child's upbringing, and the child may receive better care by ensuring
that both parents are involved with important decisions-for the child.194
The trickier questions are the problems arising from joint physical
custody. Obviously, most of the court battles arise from the question of
maintained a joint physical custody arrangement modified to be a more workable arrangement for
both parents.
188. Id. at 230. The court put great importance on the determination of who was the primary
caregiver. Id. at 230-31. The trial court had determined that the best interest of the child factors
weighed in favor of Angela as the primary caregiver. Id. at 230. The court was very specific in its
findings that the first factor of section 14-09-06.2, "the capacity and disposition of the parents to give
the child love, affection, and guidance," fell in favor of the primary caregiver, Angela. Id.
189. Id. at 230-33. In an ironic move, the court discussed that although it was a joint custody
arrangement, the caretaking tasks had not been distributed equally. Id. at 231-31. Angela washed
more of the children's clothes and made out lists for Bruce detailing the children's upcoming schedule.
Id. at 231. Because Angela had done more of the quantitative work, she was deemed the primary
caregiver, and was given custody. Id. But see Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1994)
(commenting that no mathematical computation of amount of care, custody, or control creates the
primary caregiver).
190. Schneider, 543 N.W.2d at 231. In a final irony, when Bruce tried to prove that he had
contributed equally to the care and nurturing of his children, the court commented that Bruce
mistakenly believed that quantitative terms of care equate to greater quality and stability in care. Id. at
231-32. The court stated that the joint custody arrangement impeded both Bruce's and Angela's
ability to provide a stable home for the children. Id. The court found Mr. Livingston to be a fit parent.
Id. at 231. It also heard testimony from the guardian ad litem recommending Mr. Livingston as the
better parent. Id. It then found that sole custody for Mrs. Schneider was the best solution; one parent
would now have the ability to provide a home for the children and the other would not. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. (giving custody to the mother).
193. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing the need for consistency in child
custody cases).
194. See Miller, supra note 12, at 355-56, 361-62 (discussing the importance of joint child
custody solutions in ensuring the healthy development of the parent-child relationship).
292
19971 NOTE 293
where the child will live or the issues that involve access, transportation,
or discipline between the two homes. Some believe that it would take a
social revolution to make joint custody work. 195 Other experts point out
that it is difficult to see how well joint custody arrangements work
because the only statistics and case law come from disputes where the
custody arrangement has broken down. Although a revolution is not
required in North Dakota to make joint custody work, what is needed is
resolve on the part of the courts and the legislature to ensure that
parental rights are maintained and protected.
A statutory requirement that joint legal custody is presumed to be in
the best interest of the child would give courts a definitive starting point
for custody cases. 196 From there courts could explore the possibility of
195. See MEL ROMAN & WIiAm HADDAD, T HE DisposABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR Jonrr CuSrOoY
149 (1978) (discussing that a change of societal attitudes toward parental roles is needed to make joint
custody work, but that such a change would take call for a revolution in the way people think).
196. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing states which already have statutory
authority for joint custody arrangements). Each state, in describing what it wants in joint custody, has
used different language and criteria to describe those arrangements. Id. As a way of illustration,
several joint custody statutes are listed below from varying states:
CALIFORNIA FAMILY CODE § 3080. Presumption of Joint Custody:
There is a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the
best interest of a minor child... where the parents have agreed to joint custody or so
agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor
child.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994).
COLORADO REVISED STATUTES § 14-10-123.5. Joint Custody:
(1) For purposes of this article, "joint custody" means an order awarding legal
custody of the minor child to both parties and providing that all major decisions regarding
the health, education, and general welfare of the child shall be made jointly. The order
may designate one party as a residential custodian for the purpose of determining the
legal residence of the child. The order may also provide that one party shall have a
longer period of physical custody of the child than the other party, but such provision
shall have no legal effect on the rights or responsibilities of the parties with regard to
joint custody. The order shall state that, under emergency circumstances, it is sufficient
for either party to sign legal releases or to take any other necessary measures.
(2) Joint custody shall not eliminate the duty of child support ordered pursuant to
section 14-10-115, nor shall joint custody alone constitute grounds for modification of a
support order...
(3) In order to implement joint custody, both parties may submit a plan or plans for the
court's approval... [or] the court, on its own motion, shall formulate a plan which shall
address and resolve, where applicable, the parties' arrangements for the following:
(a) The location of both parties, the periods of time during which each party will have
physical custody of the child, and the legal residence of the child;
(b) The child's education;
(c) The child's religious training, if any;
(d) The child's health care;
(e) Finances to provide for the child's needs;
(f) Holidays and vacations; and
(g) Any other factors affecting the physical or emotional health and well-being of the
child.
(4) The court may order mediation to assist the parties in formulating or modifying a
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joint physical custody and determine whether a particular case is capable
of maintaining that arrangement. This would let the parents know why
plan or in implementing a plan specified in subsection (3) of the section and may allocate
the cost of said mediation between the parties.
(5) The final plan specified in subsection (3) of this section shall be jointly agreed to
by the parties...
COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-123.5 (1988).
IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED § 32-717B. Joint Custody:
(1) "Joint Custody" means an order awarding custody of the minor child or
children to both parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared by the
parents in such a way as to assure the child or children of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents. The court may award either joint physical custody or joint
legal custody or both as between the parents or parties as the court determines is for the
best interests of the minor child or children. If the court declines to enter an order
awarding joint custody, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an
award of joint custody.
(2) "Joint physical custody" means an order awarding each of the parents
significant periods of time in which a child resides with or is under the care and
supervision of each of the parents or parties.
Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way to assure the
child a frequent and continuing contact with both parents but does not necessarily mean
the child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in length nor does it
necessarily mean the child should be alternating back and forth over certain periods of
time between each parent.
The actual amount of time with each parent shall be determined by the court.
(3) "Joint legal custody" means a judicial determination that the parents or parties
are required to share the decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority relating to
the health, education, and general welfare of a child or children.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (5), of this section, absent a preponderance
of the evidence to the contrary, there shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the
best interests of a minor child or children.
(5) There shall be a presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a
minor child if one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of
domestic violence...
IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1996).
MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS ANNOTATED § 722.26a. Joint Custody:
(1) In custody disputes between parents, the parents shall be advised of joint
custody. At the request of either parent, the court shall consider an award of joint
custody, and shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a request. In
other cases joint custody may be considered by the court. The court shall determine
whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child by considering the following
factors:
(a) the factors enumerated in section 3
(b) Whether the parents will be able to cooperate and generally agree concerning
important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.
(2) If the parents agree on joint custody, the court shall award joint custody unless
the court determines on the record, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that joint
custody is not in the best interests of the child.
(3) If the court awards joint custody, the court may include in its award a
statement regarding when the child shall reside with each parent, or may provide that
physical custody be shared by the parents in a manner to assure the child continuing
contact with both parents.
(4) During the time a child resides with a parent, that parent shall decide all
routine matters concerning the child.
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26(a) (West 1993); see also infra app. (describing a proposed
statutory supplement for North Dakota describing joint custody arrangements).
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physical custody was or was not given to them. It would also encourage
the parents to come to an agreement on what physical custody arrange-
ment may work best. The proposed factors which may be able to best
decide whether joint custody will work in a particular situation are: 197
(1) whether there exists an amicable relationship between the parties and
whether they are able to communicate and generally agree with each
other concerning joint decisions affecting the welfare of the child; (2)
whether both parties are employed and whether the child would benefit
by the assumption of joint responsibility for the care and maintenance of
the child; (3) whether the child is of such age or emotional development
that the child would benefit from experiencing the advantages of joint
physical custody; (4) whether the health or other conditions of one party
are such that custody of the child by that party alone may be undesir-
able; and (5) whether the parties live in sufficiently close proximity to
each other that the child's life would not be disrupted to any significant
degree by joint custody.198
If the court finds that a fifty-fifty split of custody time is not
feasible, then the court can find a better solution such as school year-
summer division or a rotating year-to-year custody basis. The best
solution may be one where the courts are more aware of joint custody as
a solution and fashion a remedy that best fits the particular case before
it.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the face of the family changes in our society we must be aware
and ready to change our attitudes with it. As more children are
subjected to the pains of divorce and living with a dual parent structure,
we must be ready to accommodate that dynamic of our culture. The
best solution for both the children and the parents is to find a joint
custody arrangement that works best for them. A presumption that it is
in the best interests of the child for joint legal custody in all cases is at
least a good starting point. In addition, finding suitable joint physical
custody arrangements would also be in child's the best interest where it
is possible to work out an amicable solution between the parents. No fit
parent should lose his or her right to have custody of their child due to
divorce. Instead, courts should help in solidifying the relationships be-
197. See infra app. (listing the factors which courts may use in deciding a joint physical custody
arrangement).
198. See RoMAN & HADDAD, supra note 195, at 175-76 (describing factors which may best help
decide whether joint custody will work in a particular situation).
NOTE 295
296 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:263
tween both parents and children. In a time when more parents are
learning the importance of nurturing and providing guidance to their
children, we must assure that the law lends itself to those people. It is the
responsibility of the legal system to look out for the best interests of the
child and that begins with providing any child mutual access to both
parents in a joint custody arrangement. North Dakota does not need
King Solomon to determine what the best interests of the child are when
two fit parents are requesting custody of their child. The wisdom to






This is a statutory proposal based upon the research and writing of
this article.
§ 14-09- JOINT CUSTODY:
(1) "Joint Custody" means an order awarding custody of the
minor child or children to both parents and providing that physical
custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the
child or children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
The court may award either joint physical custody or joint legal custody
or both as between the parents or parties as the court determines is for
the best interests of the minor child or children. If the court declines to
enter an order awarding joint custody, the court shall state in its decision
the reasons for denial of an award of joint custody.
I. PRESUMPTION FOR JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY
(2) "Joint legal custody" means a judicial determination that the
parents or parties are required to share the decision-making rights,
responsibilities, and authority relating to the health, education, and
general welfare of a child or the children. Except as provided in subsec-
tion (4) of this section, absent a preponderance of the evidence to the
contrary, there shall be a presumption that joint legal custody acts in the
best interests of a minor child or children. In determining the desir-
ability of joint legal custody, the best interests and welfare of the child as
described in N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06, 14-09-06.2 of this code
shall be the primary consideration. Only by rebutting the factors of
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 will joint legal custody not be awarded to
both parents.
II. DESIRABILITY OF JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY
(3) "Joint physical custody" means an order awarding each of the
parents significant periods of time in which a child resides with or is
under the care and supervision of each of the parents or parties.
"Joint physical custody" shall be encouraged. In determining the
NOTE 297
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desirability of joint physical custody, the best interests and welfare of the
child as described in N.D. CEr. CODE §§ 14-09-06, 14-09-06.2 of this
code shall be the primary consideration.
Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way
as to assure the child frequent and continuing contact with both parents
but does not necessarily mean the child's time with each parent should
be exactly the same in length nor does it necessarily mean the child
should alternate back and forth over certain periods of time between
each parent.
The actual amount of time with each parent shall be determined by
the court. Joint physical custody may be appropriate under one or more
of the following circumstances:
(a) Where there exists an amicable relationship between the
parties and they are able to communicate and generally agree
with each other concerning joint decisions affecting the welfare
of the child.
(b) Where both parties are employed and the child would
benefit by the assumption by both parties of joint responsibili-
ty for care and maintenance of the child.
(c) Where the child is of such age or emotional development
that the child would benefit from experiencing the advantages
of joint physical custody.
(d) The health or other conditions of one party are such that
custody of the child by that party alone may be undesirable.
(e) Where the parties live in sufficiently close proximity to
each other that the child's life is not disrupted to any signifi-
cant degree by joint custody.
(f) Any other circumstances that the court may deem appro-
priate.
(4)There shall be a presumption that joint custody is not in the best
interests of a minor child if one of the parents is found by the court to
be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.
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